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Abstract— This technical report presents a fragile watermarking technique useful to 
discover image manipulations at block level. The proposed algorithm is based on the 
Karhunen-Loève linear transform (KLT): it modifies some of the KLT coefficients obtained 
from a secret base defined by a secret key image so that these coefficients contain a binary 
pseudo-random message. A genetic algorithm (GA) is used to compensate for rounding 
errors introduced by inverse transforming in the integer pixel domain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The diffusion of digital multimedia content like images, videos and sounds, has given rise to the necessity of 
developing methodologies and techniques that may guarantee the protection of the digital content. In fact it is 
possible, if appropriate solutions are not adopted, to copy, modify or in some way misuse a multimedia object taking 
advantage of the digital nature of the object itself. Digital watermarking is a method that may be used to protect digital 
objects. Watermarks have many applications; for example, they may be used for copyright protection, content 
authentication, track of origin. Depending on the field of application, the various watermarking algorithms differ in 
the properties and characteristics they possess. A first classification of watermarking algorithms is between informed 
or blind systems, and refers to the detection part of the algorithm: an informed (or non-blind) system needs the 
original digital object (or some features derived from it) to perform the detection of the watermark. On the contrary, if 
only the watermarked object (and possibly a secret key) is used for the detection then the watermarking algorithm is 
called blind. 
The application that will use the watermarking system also defines the requirement for the watermark to be robust 
or fragile. A robust watermark is designed to survive modifications to the digital object aimed at removing the 
watermark itself and keeping high the quality of the object. On the contrary, a fragile watermark is designed to be 
removed by the minimal modification of the digital object (and possibly specifying the position of the modification). 
A class of watermarking algorithms are designed to be semi-fragile, in the sense that it is possible to detect heavy 
modifications to the digital object whilst light processing operations (like mild filtering or compression with high 
quality) still allow the detection of the watermark. 
The present work is aimed at presenting a fragile watermarking algorithm, so we detail here the most important 
characteristics required by this class of algorithms: 
• invisibility: the watermark should not degrade the quality of the object it is protecting; in particular, its 
presence should not be perceived by the application using the object (human or automatic); 
• detection and localization: any alteration(s) to the digital object should be revealed by a check, and 
possibly the position(s) of the modification(s) should be enlighted; 
• security against intentional attacks: the watermark should reveal attacks performed by cut-and-paste 
[1][2], transplantation and birthday attacks [3]. 
The watermark embedding is performed by modifying some features of the digital object; the features may be 
extracted from many different spaces, leading to many different algorithms with peculiar characteristics and 
properties.  
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The algorithm discussed in this technical report is developed to ensure content authentication of digital grey-scale 
images. Its main characteristics are the use of a secret key image to define a feature space based on the Karhunen-
Loève transform (KLT), the use of a watermark that is dependent on both the key image and the image to be 
authenticated, and the use of a genetic algorithm to compensate pixel rounding errors. 
 
BACKGROUND 
A. Notations 
Before describing the fragile watermarking algorithm in detail, we present here the two fundamental tools we 
used to obtain a secure and precise authentication: the Karhunen-Loève transform (KLT) is used to provide a simple 
method to define a secret key used to hide the authentication information, and the genetic algorithms (GAs), that are 
used to fine tune the image pixels in such a way they store the desired authentication information. 
These tools make a heavy use of vectors and matrices, so we recall the notation used to represent them. The 
convention employed in this work is to represent vectors as boldface lowercase letters (as f), matrices as boldface 
capital letters (as B) and matrix transposition with the symbol ' (prime). If f is a vector, then fi is the i-th element of 
vector f. Similarly, Bij is the element in row i and column j of matrix B. 
B. The Karhunen-Loève Transform (KLT) 
In this work the authentication information is inserted into a secret space on which the pixels are linearly 
projected. That is, the features in which to store the bits used to verify the integrity of the image are obtained by a 
linear transformation of the form: 
 
࢟ = ࡭࢞       (1) 
 
where x is a column vector of pixels, y is a column vector of features (which will be called transform coefficients) 
and A, called kernel, is a square matrix defining the linear transformation. The rows of A are an orthonormal basis 
for the space in which the vectors x are represented. Examples of linear transformations are the Discrete Cosine 
Transform, the Fourier Transform, the Hadamard Transform; from this, the space in which the vector y is expressed 
is called frequency domain. 
These transformations are defined by fixed kernels, so their mapping is the same for every image to which they 
are applied. Nonetheless, there is a linear transformation, the Karhunen-Loève transform (KLT) that does not have a 
fixed kernel. On the contrary, the kernel is computed from a set of vectors considered as a random field. The 
resulting basis is made of vectors with directions along the maximum data spread. We recall here the main points of 
this transform, but a more detailed description of the KLT may be found in [5]. 
Consider a random field of column vectors f, and compute the mean vector m = E{f}. Then compute the 
covariance matrix C = E{(f - m) (f - m)'} and evaluate its eigenvectors ei and their associated eigenvalues λi. 
Each eigenvalue is a measure of the data spread along the direction defined by its eigenvector. Sorting the 
eigenvectors by non-increasing order of their eigenvalues moves into the first positions the eigenvectors having, on 
average, a large contribution in the construction of the vectors f of the random field. If the eigenvectors are 
combined as the rows of a matrix B, then y = B (x - m) is the KLT of the vector x. The components of y are called 
the transform coefficients. The vector x may be perfectly recovered from y as x = B-1 y + m. For each component yi 
of y, i is called the order of the coefficient. 
In general, the KLT may be used to reduce the number of features by exploiting the correlation among vector 
components: this is useful, for example, in compression algorithms. In our algorithm, the KLT is used to create a 
hidden space in which the bits used for the authentication are hidden: this increases the security of the method 
because an attacker is not able to determine the values of the secret bits. And even if it could be possible to generate 
an orthonormal basis with a method based on a key, the KLT allows to immediately generate a basis from a real 
(secret) image: this has the advantage that the coefficients in which the bits will be inserted are related to frequencies 
of images and are not completely random reducing, with a wise choice of coefficients, the visual distortion. 
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C. Genetic Algorithms 
Genetic Algorithms (GA) are a computational model inspired by the evolution of biological beings, that has 
proved to be quite effective at solving optimization problems. Mimicking nature, a GA represents problem solutions 
as individuals, and by implementing a natural selection schema, it makes the best individuals survive and reproduce. 
In this way, GAs may find (quasi) optimal solutions to optimization problems. 
A GA starts its computation with a population of individuals, that represent initial approximate solutions to the 
problem at hand, and is generally randomly generated. Then, the initial population evolves for a number of 
generations in which the GA repeats the following steps until a termination condition is reached (usually, a 
maximum number of generations is performed or some threshold is exceeded): 
• Evaluation of the population 
• Selection of individuals for reproduction 
• Reproduction 
• Update of the population for the next generation 
Individuals in the population are evaluated by computing a so-called fitness function F. This function, applied to 
an individual, returns a quantity expressing how much the individual is close to the optimal solution. In the 
following we will use the convention that the smaller the fitness value, the better the solution (but the opposite 
convention could be used, e.g. using the reciprocal of the fitness function). 
Individuals are selected for reproduction according to their fitness value. Two strategies are commonly used to 
this purpose: roulette wheel and tournament selection. We only describe the latter strategy here, being the one used 
in our algorithm, and refer the interested reader to the literature for the former [6]. In the tournament selection 
strategy, a pair of individuals is uniformly randomly selected from the population to play a tournament: the one with 
smaller fitness value wins the tournament and is selected for reproduction. This process is repeated until a sufficient 
number of individuals is chosen. 
Afterwards, the selected individuals are mated two by two and new offsprings are generated by applying a 
crossover operator. In one point crossover, the mating individuals exchange their genetic material from the 
beginning of their chromosome to a randomly chosen cutting point; in two points crossover, the material exchanged 
in the chromosomes is the one included in between two randomly selected points. 
The reproduction step terminates by applying a mutation operator to each offspring: each chromosome has 
probability pm to have its genes randomly modified. Just like in biological species, mutation has the objective to 
explore new and probably unusual possibilities that may lead to better solutions than those obtainable from crossover 
alone. 
Finally, the population is updated with the newly generated individuals. Several strategies can be used to perform 
this step. In our case, we implemented an elitist strategy, in which the ps% best individuals from a generation 
become part of the next one, while the rest is replaced by the newly generated offsprings. For a more detailed 
discussion on GA the reader is invited to consult [6, 7]. 
The termination condition is either a maximum number of allowed generations reached or the fitness value of the 
best individual did not change in the last 10 generations and is below a predefined threshold. In both cases, the best 
individual is returned. Note that, in some cases, the algorithm can terminate without actually finding a viable 
solution. 
 
PROPOSED SCHEME 
The algorithm developed has two key features: the first one is that the signal inserted into the image to be 
authenticated is dependent on both the image itself and also on a symmetric secret key (also an image shared among 
those involved in the authentication process). The second one is that the signal is embedded into a hidden space, thus 
the features that are modified are secret ensuring the fact that the embedded signal cannot be extracted to perform 
attacks to the integrity of the protected object. 
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The basic idea of the developed algorithm is to embed a secret watermark binary sequence W into the KLT 
coefficients of an input image Io of size N×N. The KLT basis is derived from a secret key image Ik of size M×M. 
Moreover, the watermark W is made dependent on both the secret key image and the image to be watermarked, as 
explained in the following subsections. 
The whole fragile watermarking scheme KLT-F consists of four algorithms, namely the KLT basis generation, the 
watermark generation, the watermark embedding and the watermark verification, implemented in two software: KLT-
FW is used to watermark an image, while KLT-FV is used to check authenticity. 
 
A. KLT Basis Generation 
The key image Ik is divided into sub-blocks (sub-images) that are contiguous, non-overlapping and of size n×n. 
Without loss of generality we assume that M is a multiple of n (if not, some image rows and columns will not be 
considered). The complete set of sub-images is considered as a random field, and from it a KLT basis is derived. 
Thus, n2 basis are obtained, each one having n2 components. 
 
B. Watermark Generation 
The embedded watermark is generated as a function of the image to be watermarked and of the key image. This 
choice is made for two reasons: first, by generating a bit sequence that depends on (features of) the original image we 
prevent cut-and-paste attacks, birthday attacks and transplantation attacks [3]; secondly, by using the secret key image 
as the source of information for selecting features of the original image, no other information for defining the 
watermark sequence is necessary, thus allowing the image integrity verifier to use the secret key image only. 
In the present implementation, we generate the bit sequence W to be embedded in the following way: 
• the values of a set of pixel of the secret key image in predefined positions are used as pointers to address a 
set Po of pixels in the original image; 
• the values of the pixels in Po are in turn used as pointers to a sequence of pixels Ps in the secret key image; 
• the sequence of pixels in Ps are used to initialize a cryptographic hash function (in our case we used SHA-
256) that is called a number of times to produce a sufficient amount of watermark bits. 
 
C. Watermark Embedding 
To insert the watermark W used to control the image authenticity, Io is divided into non-overlapping, contiguous 
sub-images of size n×n which are transformed in column vectors of size n2. Let's call these sub-images ࢈௠௢ , 
1≤m≤(N/n)2. Then each sub-image is treated separately, and its KLT is computed using the previously computed 
secret basis images obtaining a vector of coefficients cm. 
The algorithm inserts the watermark bits into a set of s coefficients whose order is {t1, t2, ..., ts}. Given that this 
subset (and its cardinality s) may influence the performance of the algorithm, an analysis on it will be performed in a 
following section. 
To embed the integrity watermark bits, each one of the selected KLT coefficients ܿ௧೔ is modified according to the 
following rule: 
ܿ௧೔௪ = ൞
2௣൫2ି௣ܿ௧೔ + 1൯,			݂݅		ൣ2ି௣ܿ௧೔൧	mod	2	 ≠ 	 ሺܹ௠ିଵሻ௦ା௜	, ܿ௧೔ > 0
2௣൫2ି௣ܿ௧೔ − 1൯,			݂݅		ൣ2ି௣ܿ௧೔൧	mod	2	 ≠ 	 ሺܹ௠ିଵሻ௦ା௜	, ܿ௧೔ ≤ 0
ܿ௧೔,																																					݋ݐℎ݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁		
										1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݏ  (2) 
where, ܿ௧೔௪ represents the watermarked coefficient, [.] denotes the rounding towards −∞	and W(m-1)s+i is the ((m-
1)s+i)-th watermark bit. With this embedding rule each watermark bit is inserted into the bit p of the binary 
representation of each selected coefficient. To measure the number of watermark bits inserted in an image block 
w.r.t. the total number of blocks N2, the bits-per-block (bpb) quantity is defined as l = s/n2. 
RT
ra
th
ve
to
w
 
w
 
 
 
w
fr
T
sm
th
im
th
no
m
fi
 
 
T 4/2012 Dipa
After embe
he new pixe
nge (e.g. for
e modified c
To restore 
ctor v of n2 
 the actual su
The GA fit
atermark bit
here the ܤܧܴ
here ሺܹ௠ିଵሻ௘
om the GA, 
herefore, the
aller F is, t
e best chrom
age. The co
e maximum
t able to fin
For the GA
ultitude of c
nal watermar
rtimento di In
dding the s 
l values will
 8-bit pixels
oefficients. 
the bits of th
integer value
b-image pix
ness functio
s from KLT 
௠ and the ܯ
௦ା௜  is the re
i.e., 	࢈௠ீ஺ =
 fitness func
he better the
osomes. Fi
nstant τ is a 
 allowed num
d a solution, 
 parameters 
rossover var
ked image I
Figure 1: 
intermediate
formatica – U
bits into the
 have, in ge
, from 0 to 2
e watermark
s in the rang
el values, sh
n takes into a
coefficients 
ܵܧ௠ of sub
covered ((m
࢈௠ + ࢜, wh
tion F of an
 individual.
gure 1 show
threshold tha
ber of gene
at least from
we used the 
iants, we ch
w is obtained
Block diagra
 sub-image,
niversità di T
 KLT coeffi
neral, real v
55). This no
 into the co
e [-3, +3], a
ould allow t
ccount two 
and the Mea
ܨ = ߙ ∙ ܤܧ
-image m are
ܤܧܴ௠ = ∑
ܯܵܧ௠ = ሼ
-1)s+i)-th w
ere ࢈௠	is the
 individual i
 In particula
s the block 
t is consider
rations (if a
 the initial p
following va
ose to imple
 by composi
m of the GA
 F is the fitn
orino 
cients, the in
alues, so the
n-linear ope
efficients we
nd represent
o recover the
factors: the B
n Square Err
ܴ௠ + ߚ ∙ ܯ
 computed a
ห ሺܹ௠ିଵሻ௦௜ୀଵ
ሺ࢈௠௢ − ࢈௠ீ஺ሻ
atermark bit
 vector sub-
s a weighted
r, the ܤܧܴ௠
diagram of 
ed acceptab
 viable solut
opulation us
lues: popsize
ment the do
ng all the sub
-based wate
ess function 
generations
verse KLT 
y are rounde
ration may 
 used a GA.
s pixel modi
 correct wat
it Error Rat
or (MSE), i.e
ܵܧ௠  
s: 
௦ା௜ − ሺܹ௠ିଵ௥
′	ሺ࢈௠௢ − ࢈௠ீ஺
, 	࢈௠ீ஺ is the
image result
 sum of thes
weighting fa
the operatio
le for the fitn
ion is not fo
ed). 
 = 100, max
uble-point c
-images res
rmarking tec
and maxg is 
. 
is applied to
d and event
change the v
 An individu
fications of a
ermark bits f
e (BER), i.e,
., the distort
ሻ௦ା௜ห 
ሻሽ/݊૛
 corrected su
ing from the
e two parts, 
ctor α is ch
ns performe
ess value of
und in maxg
g = 500, ps =
rossover wit
ulting from t
 
hnique: bm d
the maximum
 obtain the 
ually clipped
alue of the 
al of the GA
 sub-image,
rom the KLT
 the correct 
ion w.r.t. the
  
  
  
b-image us
 inverse KL
with the con
osen to requ
d by the GA
 a chromoso
 generations
 10%, and pm
h tournamen
he GA comp
enotes the 
 number of
modified pix
 to the orig
embedded bi
 population 
 that once ad
 coefficient
extraction of
 original ima
ing individu
T and round
vention that
ire ܤܧܴ௠=0
 for every s
me, and max
 then the GA
 = 0.05. Fro
t selection.
utation. 
 
5 
 
els. 
inal 
t of 
is a 
ded 
s. 
 the 
ge: 
 	
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
al v 
ing. 
 the 
 for 
ub-
g is 
 is 
m a 
The 
RT 4/2012 Dipartimento di Informatica – Università di Torino 
6 
 
 
D. Watermark Extraction and Verification 
We note that the selected pixels in Ps are also available to the image verifier given that the secret key image does 
not change. Thus, from the secret key image Ik, the verifier extracts the KLT basis and then the expected watermark 
We can be derived, as explained in the subsection C. Watermark Generation. Afterwards, the watermarked image Iw 
is divided into sub-images of size n×n. On the m-th sub-image, the KLT is applied and the coefficients ܿ௧భ, ܿ௧మ, … , ܿ௧ೞ  
chosen to store the bits are extracted, and from them each embedded bit is restored according to the following 
formula: 
 
ሺܹ௠ିଵሻ௦ା௜
௥ = round൫2ି௣ܿ௧೔൯		mod	2	, 1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ݏ     (6) 
By comparing the expected watermark We and the recovered watermark Wr, it is possible to establish if the image 
is genuine (the watermarks are equal) or if it has been modified (the positions of the differing bits indicate which 
sub-images are altered). Thus, the proposed method has a tamper detection resolution at a sub-image level.  
It is important that the pixels of the original image in the set Po be left unchanged by the watermarking algorithm, 
otherwise the verifier would not be able to reconstruct the correct W, leading to an unsuccessful authentication even 
if the watermarked image did not undergo any modification. At the same time, it is worth noting that an attack 
modifying one of the selected pixels will lead to a completely different expected watermark We and thus to a highly 
likely failed authentication. Anyway, should this happen, the verifier is still able to detect the tampering, but loses its 
localization property. To reduce this possibility we kept the set Po of these pixels very small (in our experiments we 
used just 2 pixels). 
An advantage of our approach is that the extraction step is very light and requires a reduced computational 
power, and  it can be performed in real-time. 
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